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See p. 7 for new and recent books on pension 
policy published by the Upjohn Institute.
State public pension plans, mostly 
defi ned benefi t plans, cover pension 
benefi ts for 12.8 million active public 
employees and 5.9 million retirees and 
other annuitants.1 However, by the 
end of 2009, public pension plans had 
accumulated a total funding defi cit of 
$697 billion (measured by the difference 
between actuarial pension assets and 
liabilities). On average, public pension 
funds cover 75 percent of their liabilities, 
but individual state results vary greatly. 
The 2008 stock market crash strongly 
affected pension asset value in that equity 
allocation on average accounted for 56 
percent of invested assets. The average 
2009 pension asset beta of 0.63 suggests 
that if the market fell 35 percent (the drop 
experienced during the 2008 fi nancial 
crisis), public plans would lose 22 
percent of their total fund value.2 
Therefore, an important yet largely 
overlooked issue related to pension 
underfunding is the investment risk 
level assumed by public pension plans. 
As shown in Figure 1, the state pension 
funds equity allocation varied greatly at 
the end of 2009, from 11 percent (South 
Carolina) to 69 percent (Nebraska and 
Mississippi). The current funding gap 
prompts the question of whether the 
pension fund managers will adopt riskier 
investment positions in hopes of raising 
returns and lowering the shortfall.3 
This article summarizes our research 
that is reported in our Upjohn Institute 
working paper (Mohan and Zhang 2012). 
In it, we examine the determinants 
of pension risk-taking policy during 
the period 2001–2009 after taking 
into consideration state government 
incentives, political pressure, fi scal 
constraints, public union presence, and 
workforce features. 
Factors Affecting Pension Funds 
Risk-Taking Policy
We measure pension risk as either 
the percentage of total plan assets 
invested in the equity market or pension 
asset beta. The more risk assumed 
by the fund manager (higher equity 
allocation or higher asset beta), the 
more sensitive the fund is to market 
volatility. So, what are the factors that 
could affect investment risk? One 
incentive may be risk management. 
When a pension fund is underfunded 
the state is obligated to increase 
contributions. Unexpected, required 
funding for pension contributions may 
reduce the ability to invest in schools 
or police, for example, because in the 
short run, the state/municipal budget 
is fi xed. The implications are that, 
from a risk management perspective, 
states would prefer to have predictable 
pension contributions. Accordingly, 
asset allocation decisions would be a 
function of funding status—safe, well-
funded plans could invest in more risky 
securities, while underfunded plans invest 
in less risky assets. Alternatively, there 
is a risk transfer element to consider: 
taxpayers are ultimately responsible for 
underfunded public pension plans, and 
governments may raise taxes to fund 
pension plans (Gold 2003). 
Other factors may also affect risk-
taking investment policy. Public pension 
plans have a unique set of issues to 
consider: politics, fi scal constraints, and 
public pension accounting. Political 
infl uence could pressure the fund 
to buy bonds issued by the state or 
local government or to direct funds to 
economically targeted investments. 
And if these investments provide 
ineffi cient returns, then remaining 
assets may be invested in riskier 
securities. Furthermore, if states face 
fi scal limitations that restrict borrowing, 
pension fund debt may act as a 
substitute (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). 
Fiscal constraints also cause states to 
manipulate actuarial assumptions to 
lower required contributions (Eaton and 
Nofsinger 2004). Public pension plans 
are regulated by the government standard 
(GASB 25), which allows liabilities to 
be discounted at the assumed plan rate 
of return, which most commonly is 8 
percent. Higher assumed returns reduce 
the discounted liabilities, which in turn 
reduces the required contributions. 
Accordingly, we label these factors 
political infl uence, fi scal constraint, and 
accounting effect.
Finally, we consider union 
membership, demographic make-
up of employees, and follow-the-
leader investment behavior. If union 
membership is associated with higher 
pension obligations, investment policy 
could become riskier in order to chase 
higher returns. From a demographic 
perspective, age and gender of plan 
participants may affect the risk-
taking policy of the fund. In addition, 
investment managers tend to mimic 
each other. According to Park (2009), 
managers of public pension funds tend to 
follow peer group norms such that asset 
allocation to all equity hovers around 
64–75 percent. Alternatively, public 
pension plan managers may follow the 
best performers or plans considered to be 
large and infl uential, such as CalPERS. 
We name these factors union effect, 
demographic effect, and herding effect.
Summary of Our Results  
 
We fi nd that accounting standards 
strongly affect public fund investment 
risk, as higher return assumptions (used 
to discount pension liabilities) are 
associated with higher equity allocations 
and betas. In particular, a 100 basis point 
increase in pension return assumption 
is associated with a 1.72–4.51 percent 
increase in equity allocation. The 
corresponding increase in pension asset 
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beta given a same magnitude increase 
in the return assumption is 0.04–0.06, 
suggesting that an important incentive 
for the fund manager is justifying the 
liabilities discount rate. 
Our results also suggest that public 
funds assume more risk if they are 
underfunded or have lower investment 
returns in the previous year, evidence 
consistent with risk transfer or intent to 
pass underfunded pension obligations to 
future taxpayers. This risk-taking policy 
is not necessarily in the plan participants’ 
best interest. Taxpayers might ultimately 
be called upon to close the funding gap. 
When states are constrained from 
issuing additional debt, underfunding 
pension funds may substitute for 
borrowing. And because states can justify 
a higher discount rate for liabilities 
through the assumed rate of return, 
states facing fi nancial constraints may 
subsequently invest in riskier assets, 
resulting in higher pension plan betas 
and/or larger equity allocations. We 
fi nd that pension funds in states facing 
fi nancial constraints are more likely to 
take higher risk in their pension fund 
investment. 
Our results suggest a degree of 
follow-the-leader in that plan managers 
tend to follow the risk-investing policy 
of large and high-profi le plans (such as 
CalPERS). Furthermore, we report a 
mild public union effect; that is, in order 
to provide larger retirement benefi ts 
for unionized public employees, fund 
managers pursue a riskier investment 
allocation. Finally, limited evidence 
suggests that economically targeted 
investment policies are associated with 
lower pension investment risk. 
Overall, our fi ndings suggest that the 
risk levels of public pension funds are 
determined by various factors: incentives 
to justify the accounting discount rate 
choice, shifting pension risk to future 
tax payers, and substituting underfunded 
pension liabilities for borrowing. A fi rst 
step towards addressing the problem 
would be to appropriately discount future 
liabilities. 
Notes
1. These fi gures are from November, 2011. 
The most current fi gures, as of February 
2012, are 13.2 million active and 7.1 million 
retirees and other annuitants. Data available 
from http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/
publicfundsurvey/scorecard.asp (accessed 
March 6, 2012).
2. Beta measures the sensitivity of 
fi nancial asset returns to the overall stock 
market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 index 
as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the 
risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative 
investments, including private equity, venture 
capital, hedge funds, and other alternative 
assets. It was fi rst proposed by Jin, Merton, 
and Bodie (2006).
3. Allocation to private equity funds 
increased to 11 percent as of September 2011 
(Corkery 2012).
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Figure 1  State Pension Plans Equity Allocation as of Fiscal Year 2009
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